Exploring Ancient World Cultures
Readings from Ancient Greece
Selections from the Politics
Aristotle / Translated by Benjamin Jowett
The State and the Natural Condition of Man
Book 1, Chapters 1-2
1. Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is
established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to
obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some
good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and
which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any
other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king,
householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind,
but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a
few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a
still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference
between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made
between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is
personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the rules of the
political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is
called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
2. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin,
whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them.
In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without
each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and
this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because,
in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural
desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler
and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the
exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that
which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by
nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature
has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not
niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses;
she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made
when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no
distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural
ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female.
Wherefore the poets say, "It is meet that Hellenes should rule over
barbarians;" as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by
nature one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave,
the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he says,
"First house and wife and an ox for the plough," for the ox is the poor
man's slave. The family is the association established by nature for the
supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by
Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan,
'companions of the manger.' But when several families are united, and the
association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the
first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural form of
the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of
the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same
milk.' And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed
by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came
together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the
eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of
government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
"Each one gives law to his children and to his wives." For they lived
dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that
the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in
ancient times under the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the
forms of the Gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large
enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into
existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in
existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms
of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and
the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse,
or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and
to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that
man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere
accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity; he is
like the "Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one," whom Homer denounces- the
natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be compared to an
isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other
gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in
vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of
speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain,
and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the
perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another,
and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the
expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.
And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and
evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living
beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.
The Art of Wealth-Getting
Book 1,
Chapters 8-10
8. Let us now inquire into property generally, and into the art of
getting wealth, in accordance with our usual method, for a slave has been
shown to be a part of property. The first question is whether the art of
getting wealth is the same with the art of managing a household or a part
of it, or instrumental to it; and if the last, whether in the way that the
art of making shuttles is instrumental to the art of weaving, or in the
way that the casting of bronze is instrumental to the art of the statuary,
for they are not instrumental in the same way, but the one provides tools
and the other material; and by material I mean the substratum out of which
any work is made; thus wool is the material of the weaver, bronze of the
statuary. Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is
not identical with the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the
material which the other provides. For the art which uses household stores
can be no other than the art of household management. There is, however, a
doubt whether the art of getting wealth is a part of household management
or a distinct art. If the getter of wealth has to consider whence wealth
and property can be procured, but there are many sorts of property and
riches, then are husbandry, and the care and provision of food in general,
parts of the wealth-getting art or distinct arts? Again, there are many
sorts of food, and therefore there are many kinds of lives both of animals
and men; they must all have food, and the differences in their food have
made differences in their ways of life. For of beasts, some are
gregarious, others are solitary; they live in the way which is best
adapted to sustain them, accordingly as they are carnivorous or
herbivorous or omnivorous: and their habits are determined for them by
nature in such a manner that they may obtain with greater facility the
food of their choice. But, as different species have different tastes, the
same things are not naturally pleasant to all of them; and therefore the
lives of carnivorous or herbivorous animals further differ among
themselves. In the lives of men too there is a great difference. The
laziest are shepherds, who lead an idle life, and get their subsistence
without trouble from tame animals; their flocks having to wander from
place to place in search of pasture, they are compelled to follow them,
cultivating a sort of living farm. Others support themselves by hunting,
which is of different kinds. Some, for example, are brigands, others, who
dwell near lakes or marshes or rivers or a sea in which there are fish,
are fishermen, and others live by the pursuit of birds or wild beasts. The
greater number obtain a living from the cultivated fruits of the soil.
Such are the modes of subsistence which prevail among those whose industry
springs up of itself, and whose food is not acquired by exchange and
retail trade- there is the shepherd, the husbandman, the brigand, the
fisherman, the hunter. Some gain a comfortable maintenance out of two
employments, eking out the deficiencies of one of them by another: thus
the life of a shepherd may be combined with that of a brigand, the life of
a farmer with that of a hunter. Other modes of life are similarly combined
in any way which the needs of men may require. Property, in the sense of a
bare livelihood, seems to be given by nature herself to all, both when
they are first born, and when they are grown up. For some animals bring
forth, together with their offspring, so much food as will last until they
are able to supply themselves; of this the vermiparous or oviparous
animals are an instance; and the viviparous animals have up to a certain
time a supply of food for their young in themselves, which is called milk.
In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist
for their sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the
tame for use and food, the wild, if not all at least the greater part of
them, for food, and for the provision of clothing and various instruments.
Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference
must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. And so, in one
point of view, the art of war is a natural art of acquisition, for the art
of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practice against
wild beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be
governed, will not submit; for war of such a kind is naturally just.
Of the art of acquisition then there is one kind which by nature is a part of the management of a household, in so far as the art of household management must either find ready to hand, or itself provide, such things necessary to life, and useful for the community of the family or state, as can be stored. They are the elements of true riches; for the amount of property which is needed for a good life is not unlimited, although Solon in one of his poems says that "No bound to riches has been fixed for man." But there is a boundary fixed, just as there is in the other arts; for the instruments of any art are never unlimited, either in number or size, and riches may be defined as a number of instruments to be used in a household or in a state. And so we see that there is a natural art of acquisition which is practiced by managers of households and by statesmen, and what is the reason of this.
9. There is another variety of the art of acquisition which is commonly
and rightly called an art of wealth-getting, and has in fact suggested the
notion that riches and property have no limit. Being nearly connected with
the preceding, it is often identified with it. But though they are not
very different, neither are they the same. The kind already described is
given by nature, the other is gained by experience and art.
Let us begin our discussion of the question with the following
considerations:
Of everything which we possess there are two uses: both belong to the
thing as such, but not in the same manner, for one is the proper, and the
other the improper or secondary use of it. For example, a shoe is used for
wear, and is used for exchange; both are uses of the shoe. He who gives a
shoe in exchange for money or food to him who wants one, does indeed use
the shoe as a shoe, but this is not its proper or primary purpose, for a
shoe is not made to be an object of barter. The same may be said of all
possessions, for the art of exchange extends to all of them, and it arises
at first from what is natural, from the circumstance that some have too
little, others too much. Hence we may infer that retail trade is not a
natural part of the art of getting wealth; had it been so, men would have
ceased to exchange when they had enough. In the first community, indeed,
which is the family, this art is obviously of no use, but it begins to be
useful when the society increases. For the members of the family
originally had all things in common; later, when the family divided into
parts, the parts shared in many things, and different parts in different
things, which they had to give in exchange for what they wanted, a kind of
barter which is still practiced among barbarous nations who exchange with
one another the necessaries of life and nothing more; giving and receiving
wine, for example, in exchange for coin, and the like. This sort of barter
is not part of the wealth-getting art and is not contrary to nature, but
is needed for the satisfaction of men's natural wants. The other or more
complex form of exchange grew, as might have been inferred, out of the
simpler. When the inhabitants of one country became more dependent on
those of another, and they imported what they needed, and exported what
they had too much of, money necessarily came into use. For the various
necessaries of life are not easily carried about, and hence men agreed to
employ in their dealings with each other something which was intrinsically
useful and easily applicable to the purposes of life, for example, iron,
silver, and the like. Of this the value was at first measured simply by
size and weight, but in process of time they put a stamp upon it, to save
the trouble of weighing and to mark the value.
When the use of coin had once been discovered, out of the barter of
necessary articles arose the other art of wealth getting, namely, retail
trade; which was at first probably a simple matter, but became more
complicated as soon as men learned by experience whence and by what
exchanges the greatest profit might be made. Originating in the use of
coin, the art of getting wealth is generally thought to be chiefly
concerned with it, and to be the art which produces riches and wealth;
having to consider how they may be accumulated. Indeed, riches is assumed
by many to be only a quantity of coin, because the arts of getting wealth
and retail trade are concerned with coin. Others maintain that coined
money is a mere sham, a thing not natural, but conventional only, because,
if the users substitute another commodity for it, it is worthless, and
because it is not useful as a means to any of the necessities of life,
and, indeed, he who is rich in coin may often be in want of necessary
food. But how can that be wealth of which a man may have a great abundance
and yet perish with hunger, like Midas in the fable, whose insatiable
prayer turned everything that was set before him into gold?
Hence men seek after a better notion of riches and of the art of
getting wealth than the mere acquisition of coin, and they are right. For
natural riches and the natural art of wealth-getting are a different
thing; in their true form they are part of the management of a household;
whereas retail trade is the art of producing wealth, not in every way, but
by exchange. And it is thought to be concerned with coin; for coin is the
unit of exchange and the measure or limit of it. And there is no bound to
the riches which spring from this art of wealth getting. As in the art of
medicine there is no limit to the pursuit of health, and as in the other
arts there is no limit to the pursuit of their several ends, for they aim
at accomplishing their ends to the uttermost (but of the means there is a
limit, for the end is always the limit), so, too, in this art of
wealth-getting there is no limit of the end, which is riches of the
spurious kind, and the acquisition of wealth. But the art of
wealth-getting which consists in household management, on the other hand,
has a limit; the unlimited acquisition of wealth is not its business. And,
therefore, in one point of view, all riches must have a limit;
nevertheless, as a matter of fact, we find the opposite to be the case;
for all getters of wealth increase their hoard of coin without limit. The
source of the confusion is the near connection between the two kinds of
wealth-getting; in either, the instrument is the same, although the use is
different, and so they pass into one another; for each is a use of the
same property, but with a difference: accumulation is the end in the one
case, but there is a further end in the other. Hence some persons are led
to believe that getting wealth is the object of household management, and
the whole idea of their lives is that they ought either to increase their
money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. The origin of this
disposition in men is that they are intent upon living only, and not upon
living well; and, as their desires are unlimited they also desire that the
means of gratifying them should be without limit. Those who do aim at a
good life seek the means of obtaining bodily pleasures; and, since the
enjoyment of these appears to depend on property, they are absorbed in
getting wealth: and so there arises the second species of wealth-getting.
For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek an art which produces the
excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not able to supply their pleasures
by the art of getting wealth, they try other arts, using in turn every
faculty in a manner contrary to nature. The quality of courage, for
example, is not intended to make wealth, but to inspire confidence;
neither is this the aim of the general's or of the physician's art; but
the one aims at victory and the other at health. Nevertheless, some men
turn every quality or art into a means of getting wealth; this they
conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end they think all
things must contribute.
Thus, then, we have considered the art of wealth-getting which is unnecessary, and why men want it; and also the necessary art of wealth-getting, which we have seen to be different from the other, and to be a natural part of the art of managing a household, concerned with the provision of food, not, however, like the former kind, unlimited, but having a limit.
10. And we have found the answer to our original question, Whether the
art of getting wealth is the business of the manager of a household and of
the statesman or not their business? viz., that wealth is presupposed by
them. For as political science does not make men, but takes them from
nature and uses them, so too nature provides them with earth or sea or the
like as a source of food. At this stage begins the duty of the manager of
a household, who has to order the things which nature supplies; he may be
compared to the weaver who has not to make but to use wool, and to know,
too, what sort of wool is good and serviceable or bad and unserviceable.
Were this otherwise, it would be difficult to see why the art of getting
wealth is a part of the management of a household and the art of medicine
not; for surely the members of a household must have health just as they
must have life or any other necessary. The answer is that as from one
point of view the master of the house and the ruler of the state have to
consider about health, from another point of view not they but the
physician; so in one way the art of household management, in another way
the subordinate art, has to consider about wealth. But, strictly speaking,
as I have already said, the means of life must be provided beforehand by
nature; for the business of nature is to furnish food to that which is
born, and the food of the offspring is always what remains over of that
from which it is produced. Wherefore the art of getting wealth out of
fruits and animals is always natural.
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of household management, the other is retail trade: the former necessary and honorable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. Wherefore of an modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural.
The Ideal State
Book 7, Chapters
4-12
4. Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have
discussed other forms of government; in what remains the first point to be
considered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state;
for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of
life. And therefore we must presuppose many purely imaginary conditions,
but nothing impossible. There will be a certain number of citizens, a
country in which to place them, and the like. As the weaver or shipbuilder
or any other artisan must have the material proper for his work (and in
proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be
nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the materials
suited to him.
First among the materials required by the statesman is population: he
will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and
then what should be the size and character of the country. Most persons
think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if
they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state.
For they judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants;
whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. A city
too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city which is best
adapted to the fulfillment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the
same sense of the word great in which Hippocrates might be called greater,
not as a man, but as a physician, than some one else who was taller And
even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody,
for there must always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners
and foreigners; but we should include those only who are members of the
state, and who form an essential part of it. The number of the latter is a
proof of the greatness of a city; but a city which produces numerous
artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city
is not to be confounded with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows
that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all
cities which have a reputation for good government have a limit of
population. We may argue on grounds of reason, and the same result will
follow. For law is order, and good law is good order; but a very great
multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce order into the unlimited is the
work of a divine power- of such a power as holds together the universe.
Beauty is realized in number and magnitude, and the state which combines
magnitude with good order must necessarily be the most beautiful. To the
size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants,
animals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when
they are too large or too small, but they either wholly lose their nature,
or are spoiled. For example, a ship which is only a span long will not be
a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long; yet there may be a
ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which will still be
a ship, but bad for sailing. In like manner a state when composed of too
few is not, as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of too many,
though self-sufficing in all mere necessaries, as a nation may be, it is
not a state, being almost incapable of constitutional government. For who
can be the general of such a vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he
have the voice of a Stentor?
A state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed, if it somewhat exceed this number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. For both governors and governed have duties to perform; the special functions of a governor to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough concerning the size of a state.
5. Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state:
every one would agree in praising the territory which is most entirely
self-sufficing; and that must be the territory which is all-producing, for
to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent
it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live at once
temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. Whether we are
right or wrong in laying down this limit we will inquire more precisely
hereafter, when we have occasion to consider what is the right use of
property and wealth: a matter which is much disputed, because men are
inclined to rush into one of two extremes, some into meanness, others into
luxury.
It is not difficult to determine the general character of the territory which is required (there are, however, some points on which military authorities should be heard); it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of egress to the inhabitants. Further, we require that the land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should be well situated in regard both to sea and land. This then is one principle, that it should be a convenient center for the protection of the whole country: the other is, that it should be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any other products that are easily transported.
6. Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered
state or not is a question which has often been asked. It is argued that
the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the
increase of population, will be adverse to good order; the increase arises
from their using the sea and having a crowd of merchants coming and going,
and is inimical to good government. Apart from these considerations, it
would be undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to the
provision of necessaries, that the city and territory should be connected
with the sea; the defenders of a country, if they are to maintain
themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and by
sea; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they
will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one
element, if they themselves can use both. Moreover, it is necessary that
they should import from abroad what is not found in their own country, and
that they should export what they have in excess; for a city ought to be a
market, not indeed for others, but for herself.
Those who make themselves a market for the world only do so for the
sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind it
ought not to have such an emporium. Nowadays we often see in countries and
cities dockyards and harbors very conveniently placed outside the city,
but not too far off; and they are kept in dependence by walls and similar
fortifications. Cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of
intercourse with their ports; and any harm which is likely to accrue may
be easily guarded against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine
who may hold communication with one another, and who may not.
There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval force is advantageous to a city; the city should be formidable not only to its own citizens but to some of its neighbors, or, if necessary, able to assist them by sea as well as by land. The proper number or magnitude of this naval force is relative to the character of the state; for if her function is to take a leading part in politics, her naval power should be commensurate with the scale of her enterprises. The population of the state need not be much increased, since there is no necessity that the sailors should be citizens: the marines who have the control and command will be freemen, and belong also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will always be sailors more than enough. Of this we see instances at the present day. The city of Heraclea, for example, although small in comparison with many others, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our conclusions respecting the territory of the state, its harbors, its towns, its relations to the sea, and its maritime power.
7. Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to
speak of what should be their character. This is a subject which can be
easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated
states of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the
habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate and in Europe are full
of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they
retain comparative freedom, but have no political organization, and are
incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are
intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore
they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic
race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in
character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues
free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed
into one state, would be able to rule the world. There are also similar
differences in the different tribes of Hellas; for some of them are of a
one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others
there is a happy combination of both qualities. And clearly those whom the
legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both
intelligent and courageous. Some say that the guardians should be friendly
towards those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not know.
Now, passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and
enables us to love; notably the spirit within us is more stirred against
our friends and acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us,
when we think that we are despised by them; for which reason Archilochus,
complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these
words: "For surely thou art plagued on account of friends."
The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon
this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. Nor is it right to
say that the guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do not
know, for we ought not to be out of temper with any one; and a lofty
spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers.
And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men show most
strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at
their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they
seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the
saying: "Cruel is the strife of brethren," and again: "They who love in
excess also hate in excess."
Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of their territory. I say 'nearly,' for we ought not to require the same minuteness in theory as in the facts given by perception.
8. As in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite whole
are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in any other
combination forming a unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary
condition. The members of an association have necessarily some one thing
the same and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally for
example, food or land or any other thing. But where there are two things
of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common
except that the one receives what the other produces. Such, for example,
is the relation which workmen and tools stand to their work; the house and
the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is for the
sake of the house. And so states require property, but property, even
though living beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a
state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals,
aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas happiness is the highest
good, being a realization and perfect practice of virtue, which some can
attain, while others have little or none of it, the various qualities of
men are clearly the reason why there are various kinds of states and many
forms of government; for different men seek after happiness in different
ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of
life and forms of government. We must see also how many things are
indispensable to the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of a
state will be found among the indispensables. Let us then enumerate the
functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want:
First, there must be food; secondly, arts, for life requires many
instruments; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a community
have need of them, and in their own hands, too, in order to maintain
authority both against disobedient subjects and against external
assailants; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for
internal needs, and for the purposes of war; fifthly, or rather first,
there must be a care of religion which is commonly called worship;
sixthly, and most necessary of all there must be a power of deciding what
is for the public interest, and what is just in men's dealings with one
another.
These are the services which every state may be said to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that the community can be absolutely self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfillment of these functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is necessary and expedient.
9. Having determined these points, we have in the next place to
consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation. Shall
every man be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we
suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different
persons? or, thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals
and others common to all? The same arrangement, however, does not occur in
every constitution; as we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not
all by all, but only by some; and hence arise the differences of
constitutions, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies the
opposite practice prevails. Now, since we are here speaking of the best
form of government, i.e., that under which the state will be most happy
(and happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without virtue), it
clearly follows that in the state which is best governed and possesses men
who are just absolutely, and not merely relatively to the principle of the
constitution, the citizens must not lead the life of mechanics or
tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble, and inimical to virtue. Neither
must they be husbandmen, since leisure is necessary both for the
development of virtue and the performance of political duties.
Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of
councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law,
and these seem in an especial manner parts of a state. Now, should these
two classes be distinguished, or are both functions to be assigned to the
same persons? Here again there is no difficulty in seeing that both
functions will in one way belong to the same, in another, to different
persons. To different persons in so far as these i.e., the physical and
the employments are suited to different primes of life, for the one
requires mental wisdom and the other strength. But on the other hand,
since it is an impossible thing that those who are able to use or to
resist force should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this
point of view the persons are the same; for those who carry arms can
always determine the fate of the constitution. It remains therefore that
both functions should be entrusted by the ideal constitution to the same
persons, not, however, at the same time, but in the order prescribed by
nature, who has given to young men strength and to older men wisdom. Such
a distribution of duties will be expedient and also just, and is founded
upon a principle of conformity to merit. Besides, the ruling class should
be the owners of property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a
state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other
class which is not a producer of virtue have no share in the state. This
follows from our first principle, for happiness cannot exist without
virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the
citizens, but in regard to them all. And clearly property should be in
their hands, since the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarian
Perioeci.
Of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and the manner
in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. No husbandman or
mechanic should be appointed to it; for the Gods should receive honor from
the citizens only. Now since the body of the citizen is divided into two
classes, the warriors and the councillors and it is beseeming that the
worship of the Gods should be duly performed, and also a rest provided in
their service for those who from age have given up active life, to the old
men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of the
priesthood.
We have shown what are the necessary conditions, and what the parts of a state: husbandmen, craftsmen, and laborers of an kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and councillors. And these are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others not.
10. It is not a new or recent discovery of political philosophers that
the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should
be separated from the husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and in
Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of
Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The institution of common tables
also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as old as the reign of
Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian historians say that there was a
certain Italus, king of Oenotria, from whom the Oenotrians were called
Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying
within the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one another
only half a day's journey. They say that this Italus converted the
Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he
gave them, was the founder of their common meals; even in our day some who
are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of
his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici, who are now,
as of old, called Ausones; and on the side towards Iapygia and the Ionian
Gulf, in the district called Siritis, the Chones, who are likewise of
Oenotrian race. From this part of the world originally came the
institution of common tables; the separation into castes from Egypt, for
the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos. It
is true indeed that these and many other things have been invented several
times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for
necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were
absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that
other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees.
And we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypt
witnesses to the antiquity of all these things, for the Egyptians appear
to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular
constitution existing from time immemorial. We should therefore make the
best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply
defects.
I have already remarked that the land ought to belong to those who
possess arms and have a share in the government, and that the husbandmen
ought to be a class distinct from them; and I have determined what should
be the extent and nature of the territory. Let me proceed to discuss the
distribution of the land, and the character of the agricultural class; for
I do not think that property ought to be common, as some maintain, but
only that by friendly consent there should be a common use of it; and that
no citizen should be in want of subsistence.
As to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well ordered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain what are our own reasons for taking this view. They ought, however, to be open to all the citizens. And yet it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private means, and to provide also for their household. The expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the other private, and each part should be subdivided, part of the public land being appropriated to the service of the Gods, and the other part used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the private land, part should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that, each citizen having two lots, they may all of them have land in both places; there is justice and fairness in such a division, and it tends to inspire unanimity among the people in their border wars. Where there is not this arrangement some of them are too ready to come to blows with their neighbors, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honor. Wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those who dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbors, on the ground that their interests will pervert their judgment. For the reasons already mentioned, then, the land should be divided in the manner described. The very best thing of all would be that the husbandmen should be slaves taken from among men who are not all of the same race and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The next best thing would be that they should be Perioeci of foreign race, and of a like inferior nature; some of them should be the slaves of individuals, and employed in the private estates of men of property, the remainder should be the property of the state and employed on the common land. I will hereafter explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it is expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of their services.
11. We have already said that the city should be open to the land and
to the sea, and to the whole country as far as possible. In respect of the
place itself our wish would be that its situation should be fortunate in
four things. The first, health- this is a necessity: cities which lie
towards the east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are
the healthiest; next in healthfulness are those which are sheltered from
the north wind, for they have a milder winter. The site of the city should
likewise be convenient both for political administration and for war. With
a view to the latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens, and at
the same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to enemies. There
should be a natural abundance of springs and fountains in the town, or, if
there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the
collection of rainwater, such as will not fail when the inhabitants are
cut off from the country by by war. Special care should be taken of the
health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of
the locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly,
on the use of pure water; this latter point is by no means a secondary
consideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the
support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water
and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water,
and the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be
separated from that which is used for other purposes.
As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of government
varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or a monarchy, but a
plain to a democracy; neither to an aristocracy, but rather a number of
strong places. The arrangement of private houses is considered to be more
agreeable and generally more convenient, if the streets are regularly laid
out after the modern fashion which Hippodamus introduced, but for security
in war the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for
strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is
preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of building: it is
possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant their
vines in what are called 'clumps.' The whole town should not be laid out
in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus security
and beauty will be combined.
As to walls, those who say that cities making any pretension to
military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their
notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this fancy
confuted by facts. True, there is little courage shown in seeking for
safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character and not much
superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers may be and often
is too much both for ordinary human valor and for that which is found only
in a few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage,
the strongest wall will be the truest soldierly precaution, more
especially now that missiles and siege engines have been brought to such
perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as to choose a site for a
town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an
individual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should
become cowards. Nor must we forget that those who have their cities
surrounded by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities
which are unwalled have no choice.
If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. For as the assailants of a city do all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should make use of any means of defense which have been already discovered, and should devise and invent others, for when men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them.
12. As the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers built at
suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at common
tables, the idea will naturally occur that we should establish some of the
common tables in the guardhouses. These might be arranged as has been
suggested; while the principal common tables of the magistrates will
occupy a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appropriated
to religious worship except in the case of those rites which the law or
the Pythian oracle has restricted to a special locality. The site should
be a spot seen far and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and
towers over the neighborhood. Below this spot should be established an
agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the 'freemen's agora'; from
this all trade should be excluded, and no mechanic, husbandman, or any
such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It
would be a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the
elder men were performed there. For in this noble practice different ages
should be separated, and some of the magistrates should stay with the
boys, while the grown-up men remain with the magistrates; for the presence
of the magistrates is the best mode of inspiring true modesty and
ingenuous fear. There should also be a traders' agora, distinct and apart
from the other, in a situation which is convenient for the reception of
goods both by sea and land.
But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another section
of the citizens, viz., the priests, for whom public tables should likewise
be provided in their proper place near the temples. The magistrates who
deal with contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and those who
have the care of the agora and of the city, respectively, ought to be
established near an agora and some public place of meeting; the
neighborhood of the traders' agora will be a suitable spot; the upper
agora we devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for the
necessities of trade.
The same order should prevail in the country, for there too the
magistrates, called by some 'Inspectors of Forests' and by others 'Wardens
of the Country,' must have guardhouses and common tables while they are on
duty; temples should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated,
some to Gods, and some to heroes.
But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over details like these. The difficulty is not in imagining but in carrying them out. We may talk about them as much as we like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present.